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THE PROMISE AND PROBLEM OF BIOLOGICS
Michael A. Sanzo†
Biologics are drugs derived from living organisms and are
typically too complex to be fully characterized or chemically
synthesized. They represent some of the most promising new therapies
in the United States and are already extensively used in the treatment
of autoimmune diseases and several types of cancer. Unfortunately, the
cost these drugs is often so high that much of the U.S. population
cannot afford them.
In 2010, Congress enacted the Biologic Price Competition and
Innovation Act (“BPCIA”), whose purpose was designed to promote
the development of biosimilars. These are drugs that are similar
enough to a previously-approved pioneer drug that they can be
marketed with less testing. While it is still too early to ascertain how
the BPCIA will affect the price of biologics, economic considerations
and results from the first-marketed biosimilar suggest that its effect will
be modest.
This Article argues that part the reason for the unpromising
outlook regarding the effect of the BPCIA is that it fails to provide
adequate incentives for companies to innovate—particularly methods
of producing biologics more reliably and at a lower cost. In the
absence of improvement in this area, the effect of biosimilars on the
price of biologics is likely to be insufficient to make these drugs more
affordable. This Article suggests alternative incentives that may help
the BPCIA better achieve its intended purpose.

† Michael A. Sanzo is a patent attorney whose clients innovate in the areas of biotechnology,
chemistry, and pharmaceuticals. He may be contacted at mike@msanzolaw.com.
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INTRODUCTION
Many of our most effective therapeutic agents are derived from
living organisms and are too large or too complex to be chemically
synthesized.1 These are termed “biologics” and include vaccines, cells,
gene therapy agents, tissues, recombinant proteins, monoclonal
antibodies, cytokines, and immunomodulators.2 Current biologics
having global sales of five billion dollars or more include Humira® for
the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis; Rituxan® for Non-Hodgkins
lymphoma; Avastin® for breast, colorectal, and ovarian cancer;
Harvoni® for hepatitis C and Seretide® for asthma.3
In addition to being among the most effective therapeutics,
biologics are also among the most expensive. In 2013, Express Scripts
(the largest third-party manager of prescription drug programs in the
U.S.) reported that biologics then on the market typically cost $1,000
to over $50,000 per treatment. In some instances, biologics cost
patients hundreds of thousands of dollars per year.4 Healthcare plans
do not always fully cover these drugs,5 and many people diagnosed
1. Going Large, ECONOMIST (Dec. 30, 2014), http://bit.do/GoingLarge.
2. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA 101: Regulating Biological Products, (July 28,
2005), http://bit.do/FDAWhatBiologicalProducts.
3. Ann M. Thayer, Leading Drugs Under Fire In 2015, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING
NEWS, Dec. 7, 2015, at 19, 19; see also Kathlyn Stone, The Top 10 Biologic Drugs in the United
States, BALANCE (Oct. 13, 2016), http://bit.do/Top10BiologicDrugs.
4. Steve Miller, The $250 Billion Potential of Biosimilars, EXPRESS SCRIPTS (Apr. 23,
2013), http://bit.do/ExpressScripts_Biosimilars.
5. How to Get Your Health Plan to Cover Specialty Drugs, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2013),
http://bit.do/CNBC_SpecialtyDrugs.
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with chronic, or even lethal, diseases cannot afford the best and in some
cases, the only treatment available.6 Moreover, the strain of these highpriced drugs on total healthcare cost in the U.S. is getting worse as their
market share of the pharmaceutical market increases.7
Part of the reason for the high cost of biologics is inherent. The
complex structure of these drugs makes them much more difficult to
produce than chemically-synthesized small molecules and creates a
need for more testing.8 An additional reason is that, because of natural
variability in biological organisms and purification procedures, it is
essentially impossible to produce a generic version of a pioneer drug.9
Congress attempted to address this problem in the Biologic Price
Competition and Innovation Act (“ BPCIA” ), which came into law as
Title VII of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (sometimes
referred to as “ Obamacare” ).10 The basic rationale for the BPCIA is
that, even if generics in the traditional sense are not available for
biologics, it may still be possible to develop compounds that are similar
enough to allow them to be used as clinical alternatives without the full
degree of testing otherwise required.11
Thus far, the BPCIA has had only limited success. The first
biosimilar, Zarxio, did not arrive on the market until September of
2015, more than five years after the BPCIA became law, and at a price
only 15% lower than its reference product, Neupogen.12 Part of the
reason for the delay may have been that the legislation was so poorly
6. Lacie Glover, Why Are Biologic Drugs So Costly?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
(Feb. 6, 2015), http://bit.do/USNews_BiologicDrugsCostly.
7. Mari Serebrov, Biologics' Share of Medicine Chest Grows, and So Do the Pricing
Concerns, BIOWORLD TODAY (Mar. 9, 2015), http://bit.do/BioWorld_ShareofMedicineChest.
8. Glover, supra note 6.
9. Brian Palmer, The $8,000 Pill, SLATE (Aug. 16, 2010), http://bit.do/Slate_8000Pill; see
also JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34045, FDA REGULATION OF FOLLOWON BIOLOGICS 7-5700, at 5-6 (2010). The term “generic,” as used herein, refers to a copy of a
proprietary drug that is structurally identical and essentially identical in all other respects to a
pioneer drug. The term “pioneer drug” refers to a chemical entity that has been approved or
licensed for marketing as a drug in the U.S. for the first time.
10. Ryan Timmis, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Potential
Problems in the Biologic-Drug Regulatory Scheme, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 216
(2015).
11. Id. at 215.
12. Ben Hirschler & Michael Shields, Novartis Launches First U.S. 'Biosimilar' Drug at
15 Percent Discount, REUTERS HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 3, 2015), http://bit.do/Reuters_Novartis.
Zarxio had been approved on March 6, 2015. Sabrina Tavernise & Andrew Pollak, F.D.A.
Approves Zarxio, Its First Biosimilar Drug, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1EvptpC.
Four other biosimilars have been subsequently approved and several other applications are
nearing approval. Kiran Panesar, Biosimilars: Current Approvals and Pipeline Agents, 41 U.S.
PHARMACIST 26, 26-29 (Oct. 14, 2016). The term “reference product” refers to a previously
approved drug that the generic attempts to replicate.
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drafted and so convoluted that the Federal Circuit, borrowing a quote
from Winston Churchill, referred to it as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery
inside an enigma.”13 Unsurprisingly, substantial litigation over various
statutory interpretations of the BPCIA, as well as how to resolve those
inconsistencies, has occurred, and its case law continues to evolve.14
The present paper argues that revisions are needed in this
legislation not only to clarify its terms, but also because it fails to
provide adequate incentives for the development of innovative
production methods that will be crucial to a substantial reduction in the
cost of biologics.15 Amendments are suggested that may better induce
biosimilar manufacturers to develop more efficient means of
production without compromising the incentives that exist for
proprietary drug manufacturers to develop new biological products.
I. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
A. Historical Framework
Throughout the 1800s, there was a remarkable absence of
regulation governing the way in which drugs in the U.S. are approved,
manufactured, and sold.16 The only major regulatory legislation passed
by Congress during this period was the Drug Importation Act of 1848.17
This Act prohibited unsafe or adulterated drugs from being imported
but did not have any effect on drug products made in the U.S. The latter

13. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d 1347, 1351 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The phrase was
taken from Winston Churchill in a speech he gave on Russia on October 1, 1939.
14. Id. at 1353. The biosimilar applicant for Zarxio, Sandoz, has been in litigation with the
reference drug owner, Amgen, since October of 2014 over contradictory statutory requirements
and the case is now slated for consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court. Jason Rantanen, Supreme
Court to Review BPCIA, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 14, 2017), http://bit.do/PatentlyO_AmgenvSandoz.
Close on the heels of this case is a second case, Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052 (Fed.
Cir. 2016), which is concerned with the interpretation of essentially the same provisions. See also
Kurt R. Karst, Feeling Dissed, Amgen Sues After Sandoz Abandons the BPCIA Patent Dance
Procedures for NEUPOGEN Biosimilar, FDA LAW BLOG, (Oct. 29, 2014),
http://bit.do/FDALawBlog_FeelingDissed.
15. By most estimates, it is likely that the ACA will soon be substantially revised and that
the section concerned with biosimilars will be either kept or reintroduced. This may give Congress
an opportunity to reexamine the BPCIA in light of developments since its passage. Zachary
Brennan, Cassidy Says Obamacare Repeal Will Not Repeal Biosimilars Approval Pathway, REG.
AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y (Dec. 7, 2016), http://bit.do/RAPS_CassidySays.
16. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., The History of Drug Regulation in the U.S. (Sept. 24,
2015), http://bit.do/FDA_CDERBrochure.
17. Angela Walsh, An In-Depth Look at The Import Drugs Act of 1848 (2002),
http://bit.do/SpuriousSolution. See also Dennis B. Worthen, Pharmaceutical Legislation: A
Historical Perspective, 10 INT’L J. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPOUNDING 20, 21 (2006).
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could be sold without regard to efficacy or safety and without even
disclosing what they contained.18
In such an atmosphere, disaster is inevitable, and it arrived in the
fall of 1901.19 At that time, diphtheria patients were routinely treated
with an antiserum derived from horses. On September 30, antiserum
was collected from a horse in St. Louis who, two days later, died of a
tetanus infection.20 The antiserum was recalled, but not before a fatal
dose had been administered to thirteen children.21 In response to this,
and a similar incident in New Jersey that resulted in death of nine
children, Congress passed the Biologics Control Act of 1902.22 This
legislation was the first to require pre-market approval of drugs by the
federal government.23 In 1944, the Biologics Act became the Public
Health Service Act, and this is currently the legislation under which
most biologics are regulated.24
A second major health safety act, the Pure Food and Drugs Act,
was passed by Congress in 1906. In its initial form, this legislation
prohibited the interstate transport or sale of adulterated or misbranded
drugs,25 including all preparations in the United States Pharmacopoeia
or National Formulary.26 Despite its name, however, the Pure Food and
18. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., supra note 16; see also Walsh, supra note 17.
19. Ross E. DeHovitz, The 1901 St. Louis Incident: The First Modern Medical Disaster,
133 PEDIATRICS 964, 965 (2014); see also Valerie Marshall et al., Food and Drug Administration
Regulation and Evaluation of Vaccines, 127 PEDIATRICS S23, S24 (May 2011).
20. DeHovitz, supra note 19, at 964.
21. Id.
22. Biologics Control Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 STAT. 728 (1902) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 262); Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 682-83
(2010).
23. JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34045, FDA REGULATION OF
FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS 7-5700, at 5-6 (2010).
24. Id.
25. Section 8 of the Act defined the term “misbranded” as applying to any drugs which are
sold in conjunction with false or misleading statements about the drug or its ingredients. The
federal government initially used this provision as a basis for acting against drugs with unfounded
claims for curative effects. History of Federal Regulation: 1902–Present, FDAREVIEW.ORG
(2016), http://bit.do/FDAReview_History [hereinafter History of Federal Regulation]. However,
in 1911, the Supreme Court held that the statute did not cover all false or misleading statements,
but only those concerned with the identity of the article and possibly including its strength, quality,
and purity. Claims to cure for cancer, baldness etc., were outside the scope of the Act. See United
States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 497 (1911). In response to this decision, Congress passed the
Sherley Amendment in 1912. However, this applied only to claims that the seller knew to be false
and, like the 1906 legislation, was confined to statements made on labeling and not advertising.
History of Federal Regulation.
26. History of Federal Regulation, supra note 25; Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub.
L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (amended 1912). The law appointed the Bureau of Chemistry
of the Department of Agriculture to carry out the testing of drugs on the market. This Bureau
eventually became the FDA.

84

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 34

Drugs Act did little to actually prevent adulterated drugs from getting
to the market. Unlike the Biologics Control Act, it did not require the
pre-market testing of drug products.27
It was not until 1938 that this deficiency was addressed when the
Act of 1906 was replaced with the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic
Act (“FDCA”). This required drug manufacturers to file a new drug
application (“NDA”) prior to marketing, in which they demonstrate the
safety of their proposed product.28 Remarkably, however, the FDA had
only 60 days from the date of filing to disapprove an application or the
applicant was free to begin marketing.29 Also, there still was no
requirement that a drug maker show that its product actually worked.
Finally, in 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Drug
Amendment, which compelled drug makers to demonstrate that its
proposed product is both safe and effective.30 Drugs that were approved
prior to 1962 were evaluated by a committee that made a
recommendation as to their efficacy.31 In cases where this review
suggested that continued marketing of a drug was warranted, the
legislation provided that a generic version could be approved by the
filing of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”), which
demonstrated chemical identity and bioequivalence.32 For most drugs
approved after 1962, a generic only required the filing of a “paper
NDA,” in which safety and efficacy could be established based in part
on citations to published reports.33

27. History of Federal Regulation, supra note 25.
28. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 5-6; see also Frederick R. Ball et al., Generic Drugs:
ANDAS, Section 505(b)(2) Applications, Patents, and Exclusivities, in FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND
REGULATION, 376-78 (David G. Adams et al. eds., 3d ed. 2014). As an alternative to submitting
an NDA, a drug could be approved if it was generally recognized as safe (GRAS). In cases where
a drug had already been approved and a second manufacturer was attempting to get approval of
the same drug, the GRAS option allowed a manufacturer to avoid safety testing and market a
generic. See History of Federal Regulation, supra note 25.
29. Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
30. Ball et al., supra note 28, at 376-78. Like in a great deal of FDA legislation, the
Kefauver-Harris Amendment was prompted by a disaster—the sale of the morning sickness drug
thalidomide in Canada and Europe and the ensuing births of severely-deformed babies. A similar
fate was averted in the U.S. largely due to the intransigence of a single FDA Medical Officer,
Frances O. Kelsey. See Robert D. McFadden, Frances Oldham Kelsey, Who Saved U.S. Babies
From Thalidomide, Dies at 101, N.Y. TIMES A1 (Aug. 7, 2015).
31. Ball et al., supra note 28, at 376-78.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 377-78. Forty-seven paper NDAs were approved by FDA between January 1979
and June 1983, resulting in generic versions of 19 drugs. Edward Tabor, Generic Drug Approvals
in the U.S. Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, REGULATORY FOCUS 50, 52 (Sept. 2008). A different
procedure existed for antibiotics and insulin.
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From the viewpoint of the proprietary drug industry, the primary
effect of the testing requirements imposed by the Kefauver-Harris Drug
Amendment was that it decreased the number of drugs that made it to
the market and greatly increased the development cost of the drugs that
did.34 In addition, the Amendment resulted in a reduction in the
effective life of any relevant patents that issued before a drug was
approved for marketing.35
There were also problems for generic manufacturers wanting to
replicate drugs approved after 1962. The FDA never extended the
ANDA policy that it had established under the Kefauver-Harris
Amendment for pre-1962 drugs and the paper NDA procedure was
hampered by an absence of adequate publications for many drugs.36
Even though the FDA possessed studies establishing the safety and
efficacy of the products that generic companies were attempting to
replicate, these studies were considered to be the confidential property
of the proprietary drug sponsor and were not made available to generic
applicants.37
B. Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.
The state of the drug approval process in the U.S. after 1962 can
be seen in Roche Products v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., a case decided
by the Federal Circuit in 1984.38 The facts in this case are quite simple.
Roche had a patent covering a sedative that it had marketed under the
brand name “Dalmane.”39 Bolar was interested in marketing a generic
version of the drug in 1984, as soon as the patent expired.40 In order to
gain access to the market as soon as possible, Bolar began
bioequivalency studies needed for FDA approval in mid-1983 and,
based on this activity, Roche filed suit for patent infringement in the
District Court for the District of New Jersey.41 The case was then
transferred to the District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
34. Dale H. Geiringer, The Safety and Efficacy of New Drug Approval, 5 CATO J. 177, 178
(1985) (citing a 1980 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office). Mr. Geiringer indicates that
by 1976, the cost of developing a new drug was ten to twenty times higher than in the early 1960s.
See also Jeremy A. Greene et al., Reform, Regulation, and Pharmaceuticals—The Kefauver–
Harris Amendments at 50, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1481 (Oct. 18, 2012).
35. At that time, a patent term ran for 17 years from the date of issuance and, as a result,
the life of an issued patent eroded during FDA testing.
36. Abbreviated New Drug Application Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 28872, 28872-74 (July
10, 1989) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 10, 310, 314, & 320).
37. Id.
38. Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (1984).
39. Id. at 860.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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which held that Bolar was not liable because its use of the patented
drug was “de minimis and experimental.”42
On appeal, the Federal Circuit offered an interesting assessment
of the effect of the Kefauver Amendment on the drug approval process:
The new drug approval procedure which existed between 1938
and 1962 was relatively innocuous and had little impact on the
development of pioneer prescription new drugs. Section 505 of the
FDCA required the manufacturer of a pioneer new drug to submit
to the FDA a New Drug Application (NDA) containing information
concerning the safety of the drug. If the FDA did not disapprove the
new drug within 60 days after it received the NDA, marketing could
begin.
The provisions of the Drug Amendments of 1962 caused a
substantial increase in the time required for development and
approval of a pioneer new drug. Beginning in 1962, the amended
Section 505 required an NDA to contain proof of efficacy
(effectiveness) as well as safety, and required the FDA affirmatively
to approve the NDA rather than just to permit marketing by inaction.
A recent study indicated that it now can take on average from 7 to
10 years for a pharmaceutical company to satisfy the current
regulatory requirements.
Because most FDA-required testing is done after a patent issues,
the remaining effective life of patent protection assertedly may be
as low as 7 years. Litigation such as this is one example of how
research-oriented pharmaceutical companies have sought to regain
some of the earning time lost to regulatory entanglements. They gain
for themselves, it is asserted, a de facto monopoly of upwards of 2
years by enjoining FDA-required testing of a generic drug until the
43
patent on the drug's active ingredient expires.

The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's holdings. It found
that Bolar's activities were not covered by the experimental use
exception and were not de minimis:
Bolar's intended “experimental” use is solely for business
reasons and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
strictly philosophical inquiry. Bolar's intended use of flurazepam hcl
to derive FDA required test data is thus an infringement of the '053
patent. Bolar may intend to perform “experiments,” but unlicensed
experiments conducted with a view to the adaption of the patented
invention to the experimentor's business is a violation of the rights
of the patentee to exclude others from using his patented invention.
It is obvious here that it is a misnomer to call the intended use de
minimis. It is no trifle in its economic effect on the parties even if
42.
43.

Id. at 860-61.
Id. at 864 (citations have been omitted to improve readability).
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the quantity used is small. It is no dilettante affair such as Justice
Story envisioned. We cannot construe the experimental use rule so
broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of
“scientific inquiry,” when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and
44
not insubstantial commercial purposes.

II. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
In 1984, Congress passed the Hatch Waxman Act, which
legislatively overruled Roche and established a clearly-defined and
efficient route for generics to enter the market.45 The Act attempts to
balance the interests of generic manufacturers with the need of branded
manufacturers to recover the cost of new drug development and realize
a profit. The Act’s most important provisions are discussed below.46
A. Provisions of Primary Benefit to Proprietary Manufacturers
1. Market Exclusivity
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the sponsor of a drug application
directed to a new chemical entity is entitled to five years of data
exclusivity from the date of approval.47 During this time, the FDA will
not accept an application directed to the same drug.48 Due to the time
required for approval after an application for a generic is filed, the
market exclusivity enjoyed by the sponsor will, as a practical matter,
likely be extended for an additional one to three years.49

44. Id. at 863. The Court also declined Bolar's suggestion that public policy favors generic
drugs and that it should therefore create an exception to infringement for FDA-required drug
testing. Id. at 864.
45. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 355, 360cc
(2012)).
46. The review of the Hatch-Waxman Act and later, the BPCIA, focuses only on those
aspects of the legislation pertinent to the present discussion. Certain sections of the legislation
have been simplified somewhat and others, such as those dealing with pediatric exclusivity, have
been omitted entirely.
47. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2) (1984). Exclusivity is reduced to four years if the approved
drug becomes the subject of an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) filed by a generic
manufacturer and which contains a paragraph IV certification. See infra Part II, Section B.
48. § 314.108(b)(2).
49. Remarkably, it currently takes longer for the FDA to approve most abbreviated new
drug applications (ANDAs) for a generic than it takes to approve an application for a new drug.
This is due to a large backlog in ANDAs, and the FDA has been trying to rectify this. The FDA
aims to eventually complete approval of applications in eight to ten months. The one to three years
provided in the text is based on FDA numbers from 2015. Zachary Brennan, Generic Drug
Backlog at FDA: A Dive Into the Confusing Numbers, REG. AFF. PROFS. SOC’Y: REG. FOCUS,
(Nov. 1, 2016), http://bit.do/RAPS_Generic-Drug-Backlog.
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Further, the sponsor of an approved new chemical entity may later
file a supplemental application for a new therapeutic indication,
formulation, route of administration, or other change.50 If the
supplemental application relies on clinical investigations that are not
previously submitted for approval, the FDA will refrain from
approving any other application that relies on the same clinical
investigations for a period of three years.51
2. Establishment of the “Orange Book”
The Hatch-Waxman Act requires that an NDA include the number
and expiration date of any patents that claim either the new drug or a
method of using the new drug.52 Upon acceptance of the NDA, these
patents are included in a list of approved drugs compiled by the FDA
(known informally as the “Orange Book”) and may be used as a basis
for litigation.53
3. Litigation Under Hatch-Waxman Act (Automatic
30-Month Stay)
When an ANDA is filed for a generic product, it must include one
of several statements regarding patents listed in the Orange Book as
covering its reference drug.54 One of these statements, generally known
as a paragraph IV certification, is essentially an assertion that the listed
patents may be disregarded because their claims are invalid,
unenforceable, or do not include the proposed generic product.55 In
cases where such a certification is made, the generic applicant must,
within 20 days of filing its application, give notice to each owner of the
patent to which the certification pertains and provide a detailed
explanation for the assertions made.56 The filing of an ANDA with a
paragraph IV certification is, in itself, sufficient to constitute an act of
infringement for any patent listed in the Orange Book and the recipients
of the notice have a period of 45 days to file suit.57
50. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CHANGES TO AN APPROVED
NDA OR ANDA (Apr. 2004).
51. § 314.108(5)(2).
52. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012). The statute is silent regarding patents directed to methods
of making drugs.
53. Id.
54. § 355(j)(2)(vii). The “reference drug” is the proprietary drug product that has been
previously approved and is being duplicated by the generic manufacturer.
55. Id. See infra Subsection B.1.
56. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i)-(iv). Notice must also be given to the NDA holder if different from
the patent owner.
57. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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Importantly, the party that has brought the action then
automatically receives a stay under which the ANDA will not be
approved for thirty months unless the litigation is completed, a
settlement is reached, or the court otherwise intervenes before the
expiration of that period.58 In effect, the party alleging infringement
receives a preliminary injunction without the need to actually establish
the criteria normally required.59 The 30-month period assures the
proprietary manufacturer that it will have an opportunity to favorably
resolve an infringement action before a generic enters the market.60
4. Patent Term Restoration
In 1984, patents had a term that began running when they issued
and lasted for 17 years thereafter.61 If the patent had claims covering a
drug product, the portion of the term from the time of patent issuance
to drug approval was irretrievably lost with respect to protection of the
marketed drug. This loss however, was partly offset by the fact that,
under Roche, testing by generic manufacturers in the U.S. could not
begin until any patents covering their activities had expired.62
Hatch-Waxman upset this rough balance between lost proprietary
patent life and delayed generic market entry by introducing a safe
harbor provision under which a generic manufacturer is permitted to
engage in FDA-related testing before patent expiration.63 In order to
compensate proprietary drug manufacturers, other provisions were
included that allowed for recovery of a portion of the effective patent
life that they had lost in getting a pioneer drug approved by the FDA.64
Specifically, under Hatch-Waxman, a patent term may be extended by

58. The period may be altered either by a court decision or court order. §
355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I)-(IV). If no such action is filed, the ANDA will become effective immediately
upon approval.
59. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44643, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A PRIMER 7-8 (Sept.
28, 2016).
60. One potential problem in this regard is the delay of litigation due to a stay ordered by
a court for different reasons, for example, to allow the completion of an IPR action at the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board.
61. The term changed in 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Currently
the unadjusted term of a patent is 20 years from its effective filing date. See Karen Tripp & Linda
Stokley, Changes in U.S. Patent Law Effected by the Uruguay Round Agreements─the GATT
Implementation Legislation, 3 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 315, 316-17 (1995). Currently, the
unadjusted term of a patent is 20 years from its effective filing date. Id.
62. Id. See also Hasneen Karbalai, The Hatch-Waxman (Im)Balancing Act, 4-5 (2003),
http://bit.do/ImbalancingAct (unpublished J.D. thesis, Harv. Univ.) (on file with Digital Access
to Scholarship, Harv. Univ.).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012). This is discussed below in the section describing
advantages that Hatch-Waxman provided to generic drug makers.
64. This is provided in section 202 of the Act, codified in 35 U.S.C. § 156.
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the full period of testing taking place from the time that an NDA is filed
until the time it is approved (referred to as the “approval phase”) and
for one half of the period from the approval of an investigational new
drug application65 until the filing of the NDA (referred to as the “testing
phase”).66 Adjustments are made for the portion of this period that was
before the patent issued and for any periods during which the applicant
did not act with diligence in completing the process.67 Taking these
factors into account, the calculation is:
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑅𝑅𝑃 − 𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃 − 𝐷𝐷 −

3454634
7

,

where RRP is the sum of the approval phase and testing phase;
PGRRP is the number of days of the RRP period that predates the patent issuance date;
DD is the number of days of the RRP that the applicant did
not act with due diligence in completing the approval
process;
TP is the number of days in the testing phase; and
PGTP is the number of days of the TP period that pre-dates
the patent issuance date.68

Unfortunately, the terminology used in connection with this
statutory provision is somewhat misleading. It is not an entire patent
(and all of its claims) that is subject to extension; rather it is only those
aspects of the patent that relate directly to the subject matter approved
by the FDA. Specifically, under 35 U.S.C. § 156(b), rights during the
extension period are limited to: (a) in the case of a patent which claims
a product, any use approved by the FDA for the product;69 (b) in the
case of a patent which claims a method of using a product, any use
claimed by the patent and approved for the product;70 and c) in the case
of a patent which claims a method of manufacturing a product, the
method of manufacturing as used to make the approved product.71 In
addition, only one patent can be extended for a given regulatory review
period.72

65. An Investigational New Drug Application (“IND”) is a request for authorization from
the FDA to administer an investigational drug or biological product to humans and generally
precedes the filing of an NDA. See Investigational New Drug Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Aug. 1, 2016), http://bit.do/FDA_IND-Application.
66. 35 U.S.C. § 156(g); MPEP § 2758 (9th ed. Rev. E9R-07.2015, Nov. 2015).
67. § 156(g); MPEP § 2758.
68. § 156(g); MPEP § 2758.
69. 35 U.S.C. § 156(b)(1).
70. § 156(b)(2).
71. § 156(b)(3).
72. § 156(c)(4).

2017]

THE PROMISE AND PROBLEM OF BIOLOGICS

91

B. Provisions of Primary Benefit to Generic Manufacturers
1. Abbreviated New Drug Applications
Although abbreviated new drug applications and paper NDAs
existed after the 1962 amendments to the FDCA, the Hatch-Waxman
legislation redefined and expanded these applications in a way that, for
the first time, opened up a clear and readily-accessible route to market
for generic drugs. Specifically, an ANDA under Hatch-Waxman can
be filed for a generic having the same active ingredient or ingredients,
route of administration, dosage form and strength as a “reference drug
product” listed in the Orange Book.73 Having established the identity
of these factors, an applicant can rely on the safety and efficacy data
submitted to get the pioneer drug approved and generally only needs to
conduct studies to demonstrate bioequivalence.74
The ANDA must include a certification statement with respect to
each patent listed in the Orange Book as covering the reference drug.75
There are four options:
(i) that patent information has not been filed,
(ii) that the patent has expired,
(iii) that the patent will expire on a specified date, or
(iv) that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the
application is submitted.76
The certification made by the applicant will determine when
approval of an application becomes effective. Specifically, approval
will be effective as soon as it is made if the certification of paragraph
(i) or (ii) is made,77 and approval will be become effective on the
expiration date of the patent if an applicant makes the certification of
paragraph (iii).78 However, things get considerably more complicated
if a paragraph (iv) certification is made as this may, by itself, trigger an
infringement action against the ANDA applicant.79
73. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(v).
74. The FDCA indicates that a generic is bioequivalent to its listed counterpart if:
[t]he rate and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant difference
from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered at the
same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental conditions
in either a single dose or multiple doses.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(b)(i).
75. § 355(j)(2)(vii).
76. Id.
77. § 355(j)(5)(B)(i).
78. § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii).
79. §355(j)(5)(B)(iii); 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2).
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Apart from a new ANDA procedure, the Hatch-Waxman Act also
established a new type of application that is a hybrid between an NDA
and an ANDA and is codified in 21 U.S.C. § 505(B)(2).80 Unlike the
NDA of 21 U.S.C. § 505(B)(1), at least a portion of the support
provided by the applicant under section (B)(2) may be derived from
someone else's NDA data (regardless of whether the applicant has
obtained a right of reference) or from a publication.81 These
applications may be directed to a new chemical entity or to a new
dosage form, strength, route of administration, or active agent.82
2. Safe Harbor for Testing
Hatch-Waxman overturned Roche and immunized companies
from infringement actions for carrying out tests to meet FDA
requirements before patents covering such activities have expired.83
This provision was codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which reads:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or
sell within the United States or import into the United States a
patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products.

As a result, a manufacturer can be fully ready to market a generic
product as soon as approval of an ANDA becomes effective and
exclusivity of the reference drug owner has expired.
3. Market Exclusivity
As a further incentive for generic manufacturers, Hatch-Waxman
provides that the first company to successfully file an ANDA
application with a paragraph IV certification will receive 180 days of
market exclusivity relative to other generic manufacturers beginning
on the first day of commercial marketing.84 This means that for the 180-

80. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: APPLICATIONS COVERED BY
SECTION 505(B)(2), (Oct. 1999). These applications require much more testing than an ANDA
but much less that an application under 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)-(2).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). The Act also amended patent law by adding 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(2), which makes the filing of an ANDA an act of infringement if the purpose of such
submission is to obtain approval to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug,
veterinary biological product, or biological product claimed in a patent or the use of which is
claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent.
84. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
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day period, the first ANDA filer would be the only producer, other than
the NDA holder, that can market the approved drug.85
III. COMPARING PROVISIONS OF THE BPCIA TO HATCH-WAXMAN
The BPCIA is essentially the biologics corollary of HatchWaxman,86 and there are many similarities in the structuring of the two
Acts. Like Hatch-Waxman, the BPCIA has some provisions designed
to primarily benefit proprietary drug manufacturers and others that
primarily benefit follow-on manufacturers. Most of these have been
substantially altered under the BPCIA, with the biggest changes in the
area of litigation. In addition, there are a few Hatch-Waxman
provisions that were not part of the BPCIA legislation at all but that are
available for and benefit biologic drug makers. The sections below
consider the provisions of greatest importance to companies working
with biologics.
A. Provisions of Primary Interest to Proprietary Manufacturers
1. Patent Term Restoration
Arguably, the greatest benefit to proprietary drug manufacturers
of the Hatch-Waxman amendment is the recovery of a portion of patent
term lost due to FDA testing. This is available regardless of whether
the drug undergoing testing is a small, chemically-synthesized
compound or a biologic.87 However, due to factors unique to biological
products, the process of choosing which patent to extend may be
somewhat different.88
Because small molecule drugs regulated under Hatch-Waxman
are easily synthesized, purified, and characterized, patent claims
directed to methods of manufacturing are generally regarded as being
easily circumvented and of relatively little value.89 It would therefore
be unusual for a proprietary drug maker to choose a patent with claims
to a method of manufacture as the one to extend.90
However, this is not true for biologics. For these drugs, the
method of production is crucial in determining their chemical and
clinical characteristics.91 In fact, it may be difficult or impossible to
85. Id.
86. Henry I. Miller, Still Awaiting the Biosimilars Revolution, 38 REG. 22, 22 (2015).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 156.
88. See Brian Coggio & Peter Ludwig, Process Patents Are Vital In Biotech—Why Not
Extend Them?, LAW360 (Aug. 10, 2015, 10:19 AM EST), http://bit.do/Law360_ProcessPatents.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. W. Nicholson Price & Arti V. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition
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define these compounds except in terms of the way they are made and
the way that they behave.92 Claims to methods of manufacture are
therefore on par with claims to the compounds per se, and increasing
the term of patents with such claims makes a good deal of sense. 93
2. Market Exclusivity
The BPCIA grants to the first party that successfully obtains a
license for a biologic four years of data exclusivity (during which a
biosimilar application cannot be filed)94 and twelve years of market
exclusivity (during which approval of a biosimilar application will not
be made effective).95 However, these restrictions do not apply to the
sponsor of the reference product itself.96 The sponsor may, at any time,
file a supplement to its approved biologics license application (BLA)
or a subsequent BLA for either: (a) “a new indication, route of
administration, dosing schedule, dosage form, delivery system,
delivery device, or strength,” or (b) “a modification to the structure of
the biological product that does not result in a change in safety, purity,
or potency.”97
B. Provisions of Primary Benefit to Follow-On Manufacturers
1. Safe Harbor for Testing
One of the main incentives for enacting Hatch-Waxman was to
reverse Roche and provide drug manufacturers with the ability to
perform the experiments needed to ready generics for market as soon
as possible.98 This was done through the portion of the Act that is
codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). However, the safe harbor is not
confined to generics and has been held to cover a broad array of
activities.99 Thus, it is of substantial value to companies involved in
producing biosimilars.

and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1033-35 (2016).
92. See id. at 1036-37 (discussing how production methods of biologics can alter their
therapeutic effects).
93. Coggio & Ludwig, supra note 88.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(B) (2015).
95. § 262(k)(7)(A).
96. § 262(k)(7)(C).
97. Id.
98. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 59, at 5.
99. See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206-07 (2005);
Momenta Pharm. v. Amphastar Pharm., 686 F.3d 1348, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing the
scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).
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2. Abbreviated Path to Licensing
As with the ANDA procedure for generics, applications for
follow-on biologics are based on a comparison between the new
follow-on product and a reference product that has already been
evaluated and approved.100 The process is abbreviated in the sense that
an applicant can rely on the safety and efficacy data of the reference
product.101 However, meeting the other criteria required for approval is
much more difficult for biosimilars than establishing that a generic has
identical chemical characteristics and bioequivalence.
In order to establish biosimilarity, an applicant must show that the
proposed product is “highly similar to the reference product
notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive components”
and that it exhibits “no clinically meaningful differences” in terms of
safety, purity, and potency.102 The statute indicates that this is to be
accomplished using: (a) analytical studies; (b) animal studies (which
include an assessment of toxicity); and (c) clinical studies
demonstrating safety, purity, and potency for a use that has been
approved for the reference product.103 The Act further indicates that
clinical studies should include an assessment of the immunogenicity
and pharmacokinetics or pharmacodynamics of the proposed
product.104
Beyond these requirements, a biosimilar applicant must show
that: a) the labeling proposed recommends conditions of use that have
been approved for the reference product; b) the route of administration,
dosage form, and strength of the proposed product are the same as the
reference product; and c) the facility in which the biological product is
manufactured meets standards set by the FDA.105 Finally, if the
mechanism of action of the reference product is known with respect to
the approved use, an applicant must show that the proposed biosimilar
utilizes the same mechanism.
An applicant for a biosimilar has the option of trying to establish
that the proposed product qualifies as an “interchangeable.”106 This is
defined as a drug that meets the criteria for being a biosimilar and
100. WENDY H. SCHACT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41270, P.L. 111148: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS (May 25, 2010) at 1-3.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I).
102. § 262(i)(2).
103. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(aa)-(cc).
104. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(I)(cc).
105. § 262(k)(2)(A)(i)(II)-(IV).
106. §§ 262(k)(2)(A)(i), (5)(A) (stating an application for a biosimilar may only have a
single reference product).
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which, in addition, “can be expected to produce the same clinical result
as the reference product in any given patient.”107 If the drug is to be
administered more than once to an individual, the statute requires that
“the risk in terms of safety or diminished efficacy of alternating or
switching between use of the biological product and the reference
product is not greater than the risk of using the reference product
without such alternation or switch.”108
A primary difference between a biosimilar and an interchangeable
is that the latter may be substituted for its reference product at the
pharmacy without the intervention of a health care provider whereas
the former cannot.109 Thus, interchangeables have market
characteristics closer to those of a generic than do biosimilars.110
3. Market Exclusivity
The BPCIA does not provide any exclusivity for a biosimilar.
However, if a biosimilar applicant is the first to establish
interchangeability, the FDA will not approve a second interchangeable
for a period that is the earliest of several options. Specifically, if the
drug is approved and marketed without litigation, then exclusivity will
end one year after commercialization.111 However, if the
interchangeable applicant is sued for patent infringement under
provisions relating to the first phase of the BPCIA process,112 then
exclusivity ends on the earliest of: (a) 18 months from the time of a
final court decision or dismissal,113 or (b) 42 months after approval of
the interchangeable if litigation is ongoing within the 42-month
period.114 Finally, the statute indicates that exclusivity will end 18
months after the date of approval if the applicant is not sued.115 By
measuring the length of time from approval rather than
107. See §§ 262(i)(2), (k)(4).
108. § 262(k)(4).
109. § 262(i)(3).
110. Approximately 40 states in the U.S. allow pharmacists to substitute a generic for a
branded pharmaceutical without consulting with the prescribing physician. See Jeffrey J. Masters,
Note, Not Exactly the Same: An Examination of How Generic Substitution Laws Inadequately
Protect Consumers’ Needs if Taking Generic Drugs Results in Injuries, 8 DREXEL L. REV. 233,
240 (2015). A smaller number allow such substitution for an interchangeable. Id. at 240-41.
111. § 262(k)(6)(A).
112. See infra Part III, Section C. Patent infringement actions under the BPCIA proceed in
two distinct phases. The first phase begins when an application for a biosimilar is accepted by the
FDA and the second phase occurs after an application is approved and is initiated by the biosimilar
applicant giving notice to the reference product sponsor of its intent to commercialize the product.
113. § 262(k)(6)(B).
114. § 262(k)(6)(C)(i).
115. § 262(k)(6)(C)(ii).
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commercialization, the BPCIA sets a limit on how long it will withhold
the licensing of a second interchangeable. This prevents a situation in
which the first interchangeable applicant approved fails to market the
interchangeable within a reasonable period of time, e.g., due to an
agreement with the reference product sponsor under which they
conspire to maintain high prices by keeping additional
interchangeables off of the market.
C. Litigation Under the BPCIA (The “Patent Dance”)
Some of the most complex portions of the BPCIA are concerned
with the way in which patent disputes arising between proprietary drug
sponsors and biosimilar applicants should be handled. The legislation
sets forth a series of convoluted interactions that have often been
referred to in the literature as the “patent dance,”116 which progresses
in two distinct phases as described below.117
1. Phase 1: Negotiation and Early Litigation
The first phase is initiated by the FDA’s acceptance of an
application for a biosimilar license and is designed to encourage parties
to negotiate.118 Under current law, this phase is optional.119 If the
biosimilar applicant chooses to enter into phase 1, it must provide the
reference product sponsor with a copy of its application and disclose
the process that will be used to manufacture the product no later than
20 days after acceptance of the application by the FDA.120 The
reference product sponsor then has 60 days to provide the applicant
with a list of patents that could reasonably be used in an infringement
action and indicate which patents, if any, it would be willing to
license.121

116. Jon Tanaka, “Shall” We Dance? Interpreting the BPCIA’s Patent Provisions, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 659, 659 (2016).
117. See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d at 1363 (Newman, J., dissenting).
118. The steps in the first and second stages of this process are summarized in Amgen Inc.
v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d 1052, 1055-58 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
119. Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d at 1356-57. However, this may change. The U.S.
Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari for this case on January 13, 2017. See
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., SCOTUSBLOG (last visited June 4, 2017),
http://bit.do/SCOTUSBlog_AmgenvSandoz.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(2)(A). If the applicant does not comply with these requirements,
then the submission of its application is deemed to constitute an act of infringement with respect
to any patent that could have been listed. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(3)(A). The reference product sponsor may later supplement the list
with newly-issued or licensed patents that it reasonably believes might be infringed by the
marketing of the proposed biosimilar. § 262(l)(3)(C).
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Once the applicant receives the patent list from the reference
product sponsor, the applicant has 60 days to provide a reply in which
it must explain why the proposed product would not infringe the claims
in each patent, why the claims are not valid, or why the claims are
unenforceable.122 It can also, optionally, list any additional patents that
it believes could potentially be asserted in an infringement action due
to the marketing of the proposed product.123 As an alternative, the
applicant may provide the reference product sponsor with a statement
that it does not intend to begin commercial marketing of the biological
product before the date that a listed patent expires.124
In the next step, the reference product sponsor has 60 days to reply
with a statement refuting the arguments of the applicant and explaining
why the patents would, in fact, be infringed.125 Once this is received,
the parties then will have a period of 15 days to try to come to an
agreement on which patents on the lists should be the subject of an
infringement action.126 If they reach an agreement, then the reference
product sponsor has a period of 30 days to file suit.127
If instead, the parties cannot come to an agreement within the 15
day negotiation period, they then exchange lists of patents a final time,
but before doing so, the biosimilar applicant must inform the reference
product sponsor of the number of patents that it, i.e., the biosimilar
applicant, intends to list.128 The number of patents that the reference
product sponsor lists can be no greater than the number listed by the
biosimilar applicant except that, if the applicant chooses not to list any
patents, the reference product sponsor can still list one.129
Once this exchange is completed, the reference product sponsor
has 30 days to bring a suit for infringement but can only do so with
respect to a patent on one of the lists. Because of this, the reference
product sponsor may have patents potentially infringed by the
marketing of the proposed biosimilar, but which cannot be enforced
during the first phase of the process.130
122. § 262(l)(3)(B). The newly added patents may be enforced in phase 2 of the process but
not in phase 1.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. § 262(l)(3)(C).
126. § 262(l)(4)(A).
127. § 262(l)(6)(A). In this regard, the BPCA made it an act of infringement to submit an
application for a biosimilar that is covered by a patent and which appears on the negotiated list.
This is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(5)(A).
129. § 262(l)(5)(B)(ii).
130. See Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d at 1056 (“But the Biologics Act—having
provided for a narrowing of the scope of the [§ 262(l)(6)] litigation, including by allowing the
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2. Phase 2: Pre-Commercialization Litigation
The second phase of the patent dance begins after the FDA
approves a biosimilar for marketing and is much simpler than the
first.131 It is triggered by the biosimilar applicant notifying the reference
product sponsor of the approved license, which must occur at least 180
days before the first date of commercial marketing.132 This notification
requirement is mandatory regardless of whether a biosimilar applicant
has chosen to exchange information under the first phase of the patent
dance or not.133 Once the reference product sponsor has received
notice, it has until the time of commercialization to request a
preliminary injunction based on any patent included in the original lists
of patents exchanged in phase 1, but not litigated, or with respect to
any subsequently issued or licensed patent which had been provided to
the biosimilar applicant within 30 days of issuance or licensing.134
3. Limitations on Relief
There is no legal requirement that a patent owner bring an
infringement action against a biosimilar applicant under the provisions
of the BPCIA. A reference drug sponsor that does not exchange patent
lists under phase 1 of the patent dance, that omits relevant patents from
the lists exchanged in phase 1, or that does not bring an action within
the time limits required in 42 U.S.C. § 262(l) can still file an action
under a different section of 35 U.S.C. § 271. However, under these
circumstances, the only remedy available will generally be a
reasonable royalty.135 In contrast, a sponsor that works within the
framework of the BPCIA and fully complies with its requirements may
be able to recover damages and obtain an injunction.136
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP OF HATCH-WAXMAN TO THE BPCIA
In the early 1900s Congress established two primary frameworks
for regulating drugs, the Biologics Act of 1902 (currently part of the
Public Health Service Act (“PHS”)) and the Pure Food and Drug Act
applicant to exclude potentially meritorious patents from that litigation—provides, in [§
262(l)(8)], for a second stage of patent litigation.”).
131. See Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 794 F.3d at 1363 (Newman, J., dissenting).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(8)(A).
133. Amgen Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 827 F.3d at 1056.
134. § 262(l)(7)-(8). See also Tanaka, supra note 116, at 664. It appears that patents not
falling into one of these two groups cannot be enforced by the reference product owner under 42
U.S.C. § 262(l).
135. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(6).
136. Id.
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of 1906 (currently the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”)).137 Although these legislative lines of these Acts are
distinct, there has historically been a good deal of overlap and
confusion regarding their authority.138 For largely arbitrary reasons,
there are some biologics, e.g., insulin and human growth hormone, that
are regulated under the FDCA139 and biosimilars that have been
approved under Section 505(b)(2).140 In addition, provisions that are
enacted in connection with one Act sometimes extend to products
regulated by another.141
The overlap and confusion between the authority of the FDCA
and PHS with regard to biologics should be substantially reduced in the
future. Section 7002(b) of the BPCIA defines the term “biological
product” as follows:
The term “biological product” means a virus, therapeutic
serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or
derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically
synthesized polypeptide), or analogous product, or
arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other
trivalent organic arsenic compound), applicable to the
prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of
human beings.142
Significantly the above definition includes the phrase, “protein
(except any chemically synthesized polypeptide).” Thus, the BPCIA
encompasses recombinant and natural proteins that had been
previously categorized as falling under the FDCA.143 After March of
2020, all biologics, including these proteins, will be marketed through
a biologic licensing application and, thereafter, the BPCIA pathway
will be the sole one used for follow-on biologic products.144
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF METHODS OF PRODUCTION
Because of their size and complexity, biologics and biosimilars
require a level of testing that is substantially greater than that needed

137. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 5.
138. This is discussed in considerable detail in Carver et al., supra note 22, at 682-88.
139. Id. at 684.
140. Id. at 685-86.
141. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271(e)(2). See also SCHACT & THOMAS,
supra note 100, at 4-5.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1).
143. Carver et al., supra note 22, at 807.
144. Id.; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7002(e), 124
Stat. 119, 817 (2010).

2017]

THE PROMISE AND PROBLEM OF BIOLOGICS

101

for a small molecule drug or generic in order to be approved.145 For the
same reasons, biologics and biosimilars are more expensive to produce
once they are on the market.146 Since manufacturers must recover the
costs incurred in obtaining approval and the ongoing costs of making
the products that they market, it follows that an effective plan for
reducing the price of biologics must include a strategy for improving
methods by which these drugs are made and tested.
VI. FINDING THE RIGHT MIX OF INCENTIVES
Recent analysis suggests that, relative to generics, biosimilars
may have little impact on the cost of prescription medications in the
U.S.147 After six months on the market, the biosimilar Zarxio was
priced only 15% lower than its reference product and had been able to
capture only about 10% of sales.148 By way of comparison, at six
months, a generic would be expected to be priced more than 40% lower
than its reference product and to have captured about 75% of sales.149
Part of the reason why biosimilars may not be as effective at
reducing drug prices as generics may be that the incentives provided
under the BPCIA do not adequately take into account the differences
between these drugs and generics.150 A biosimilar will essentially never
be an exact duplicate of its reference drug and may occupy a market
position between being a lower cost replacement and a product offering
other characteristics.151 In addition, the unpredictability inherent in
biological systems means that companies developing biosimilars face
a much greater risk of failing to produce a product that can compete
effectively in the marketplace. Finally, methods of manufacturing
biosimilars are of crucial importance in determining the extent to which

145. Price & Rai, supra note 91, at 1032; Tanaka, supra note 116, at 661-62. Unlike small,
chemically-synthesized drugs, the method by which a biologic is made must be approved by the
FDA. 21 C.F.R. § 601.20(c) (2017).
146. Erwin A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., The Economics of Biosimilars, 6 AM.
HEALTH & DRUG BENEFITS: BUS. 469, 469-71 (2013); Henry G. Grabowski et al., Entry and
Competition in Generic Biologics, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 439, 439-40 (2007).
147. Paul E. Greenberg et al., The Biosimilar Revolution Is Just Beginning in the U.S.,
ANALYSIS
GROUP:
HEALTH
CARE
BULL.,
(Fall
2016/Winter
2017),
http://bit.do/AnalysisGroup_BiosimilarRevolution.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. For a discussion of barriers to market entry for biosimilars, see Blackstone & Fuhr,
supra note 146, at 469-78.
151. Henry Grabowski et al., Pharmaceutical Patent Challenges: Company Strategies and
Litigation Outcomes, 3 AM. J. HEALTH ECON. 33 (2017); Henry Grabowski et al., Recent Trends
in Brand-Name and Generic Drug Competition, 17 J. MED. ECON. 207 (2014) [hereinafter
Grabowski et al., Recent Trends].

102

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 34

these drugs can be marketed at lower prices than their reference
products.
The sections below describe several possible modifications to the
present system that are envisioned as being used together but that, with
some revision, could be used separately. The overall objectives are to:
(a) promote the marketing of drug products that compete for customers
both vertically (i.e., based primarily on price) as well as horizontally
(i.e., based primarily on different clinical characteristics); (b) allow
both new drug applicants and biosimilar applicants to benefit from
innovations that they make, including innovations related to
manufacturing; and (c) minimize the use of litigation as a tool for
resolving differences.152 The modifications suggested are designed to
illustrate approaches that might be taken. They are not intended to be
complete or comprehensive.153
A. Expanding the Use of the Purple Book
Although not required by the BPCIA, the FDA began publishing
the “Purple Book” in 2014 in which it lists all licensed biologics and
biosimilars.154 The name suggests that this is the biologics counterpart
of the Orange Book that was established by the Hatch-Waxman Act for
drugs approved under the FDCA. However, this is not the case. The
Purple Book currently plays no role in patent litigation and does not
even list patents covering a licensed product.155
This would need to change in order to meet the objectives
discussed herein. Patents in effect at the time of approval of a biologic
or biosimilar would need to be listed by the drug sponsor. These patents
could be used to provide a basis for infringement actions in a way
similar to Orange Book patents. Unlike the Orange Book, 156 however,
the Purple Book should include not only patents claiming compositions
and methods of use but also patents claiming methods of manufacture.
Biosimilar manufacturers should also have an opportunity to list
patents and use them in a similar manner to proprietary companies. For
152. See generally JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41483, FOLLOW-ON
BIOLOGICS: THE LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES, (Jan. 15, 2014) (the Summary
section discusses the objectives of the BPCIA); Blackstone & Fuhr, Jr., supra note 146, at 47071 (discussing the economics of the BPCIA).
153. But see Ude Lu, Note, Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Striking a
Delicate Balance Between Innovation and Accessibility, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 613, 613-51
(2014).
154. Kurt R. Karst, The “Purple Book” Makes Its Debut!, FDA L. BLOG (Sept. 9, 2014),
http://bit.do/FDALawBlog_ThePurpleBook.
155. Mari Serebrov, Purple Will be the New Orange for Biosimilar Makers, BIOWORLD
(Apr. 14, 2015), http://bit.do/BioWorld_Purple-will-be-New-Orange.
156. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
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example, if the biosimilar producer patented a new method for
producing a reference product, it could list the patent in the Purple
Book and then use it as a basis for exclusivity both against the owner
of the reference product and against other biosimilar applicants.
B. Using Total and Partial Exclusivity Periods
A biologic producer is currently given 12 years of exclusivity
from the time that a drug is approved, during which the FDA will not
license a biosimilar.157 Interestingly, in a study of the top-selling 437
drugs in the U.S., the study found that total market exclusivity, i.e.,
exclusivity due both to patents and FDA regulations from the time of
FDA approval of a pioneer drug to the availability of the first generic,
is about 12.4 years.158 Thus, if FDA-based market exclusivity were to
be extended much beyond this, the importance of patents in
maintaining exclusivity would be greatly diminished and litigation
challenges to patents should decrease accordingly.159 A longer term
would also have the effect of giving drug makers an extended period to
recover production costs and potentially encourage them to reduce
prices somewhat. However, extending exclusivity also means that the
benefits of biosimilar entry on price reduction and innovation would be
lost.
One way to balance these factors is to divide an approved
product's exclusivity term into a relatively short period of total
exclusivity, e.g., seven years, and a much longer period of partial
exclusivity, e.g., an additional 15 years. During the initial period, the
FDA would not approve a biosimilar application and during the latter
period of partial exclusivity, the reference product owner would
receive royalty payments from biosimilar producers.

157. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A).
158. Bo Wang et al., Variations in Time of Market Exclusivity Among Top-Selling
Prescription Drugs in the United States, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 635, 635 (Apr. 2015) (For
the purposes of the study, market exclusivity included regulatory exclusivity periods, the life left
on the original patent covering the drug, secondary patents covering peripheral aspects of drugs
such as metabolites or alternative formulations and other factors determining generic market
entry. The authors report a median market exclusivity of 12.5 years.). An earlier study had
reported an average market exclusivity of between 12.4 and 13.7 years. Henry G. Grabowski et
al., Evolving Brand-Name And Generic Drug Competition May Warrant A Revision Of The
Hatch-Waxman Act, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2157, 2160 (2011).
159. Regulatory exclusivity, being based solely on the FDA’s evaluation of clinical data (as
opposed to a myriad of factors affecting the validity of patents) is much less susceptible to court
challenge.
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C. Promoting Innovation and Competition
From the perspective of proprietary drug manufacturers, the main
problem with the exclusivity provided by the FDA is that it is of very
narrow scope.160 It is confined to a drug with specific clinical
characteristics used in the treatment of a specific condition.161 This
protects the manufacturer from the untimely entry of biosimilars on to
the market but does not stop the entry of closely-related products that
compete as an alternative.162 This problem may be offset through the
use of patents, which have the potential of providing broader
protection. However, patents must be enforced by litigation and are
highly susceptible to invalidation in post-grant review proceedings at
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.163 What is desired is a system
that allows a manufacturer to recover for the innovations it has made
(not just for bringing a product to market), that discourages litigation,
and that provides a reasonable assurance of recovery of drug
development and marketing costs.
One way to address this would be to fix the term of exclusivity
based on FDA provisions but determine the scope of exclusivity based
on patents covering the licensed product. Specifically, a pioneer drug
producer might be granted exclusivity based on FDA approval and this
would cover, as it does now, the approved drug product and use.
Beyond this, however, the obligation to compensate the drug sponsor
would be determined by the scope of any patents identified in the FDA
Purple Book as covering the product, the use of the product, and the
method of making the product.
Continuing the example suggested above, there might be a period
of seven years where a proprietary manufacturer is given total
exclusivity based on FDA approval alone and 15 years of partial
exclusivity during which it has FDA exclusivity and patent exclusivity.
FDA exclusivity would apply to products granted as biosimilars and
would not depend at all on patent protection. Therefore, a biosimilar
sponsor would be required to pay the statutory royalty unless it had
some basis for alleging that the reference product should not have been
listed by the FDA. The scope, validity, and enforceability of patents
would be irrelevant.
160. Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity Make Biologic Patents Passé?, 29 SANTA
CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 279-80 (2013).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Joanna Shepherd, Disrupting the Balance: the Conflict Between Hatch-Waxman and
Inter Partes Review, 6 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 14, 28-32 (2016); Peggy P. Ni,
Rethinking Finality in the PTAB Age, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 557, 562-69 (2016).
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Patent exclusivity would apply to new biologics that do not
qualify as biosimilars but are so closely related to a listed drug that they
fall within the scope of one or more patents listed in the Purple Book.
In one possible scenario, notifications of all approvals would be
published by the FDA and would be followed by a period of delay, e.g.,
90 days, before the approved product could be marketed. During this
time, any party with a patent listed in the Purple Book could seek an
injunction, if their period of total exclusivity had not yet expired, or
demand the payment of a statutorily set royalty, if their product was in
the period of partial exclusivity and the newly-approved product
infringed one or more claims in a listed patent. If the party with the
newly-approved product agreed to make payments, it would be
immune from litigation by the patent owner. If instead it refused, it
would be subject to an action for infringement.164
This scenario has a number of benefits that do not exist under the
current BPCIA framework. When combined with the provisions
discussed below, it provides a path for infringing drug products to enter
the market that would not otherwise be possible. Specifically, the
sponsor of the newly-approved product could avoid an infringement
action by respecting the patentee’s period of total exclusivity and
agreeing to pay royalties for the period of partial exclusivity. The patent
owner, gets a guarantee of seven years of complete exclusivity and 15
years of royalty payments for biosimilars which cannot be lost due to
patents being invalidated. In addition, the patent owner gets an
opportunity to be compensated for other innovations that it has made
and patented.
Provisions designed to discourage litigation could also be
incorporated into the system. For example, if the owner of a newlyapproved application refused to pay royalties and subsequently lost in
an action for infringement, it might be subject to an injunction keeping
its product off of the market until the period of exclusivity for the patent
owner has completely expired. Similarly, if the proprietary
manufacturer brought an action and lost, it might be required to forfeit
any right to receive royalties (either FDA-based or patent-based) from
the applicant and, in cases where the litigation was clearly unwarranted,
be required to pay some or all of the applicant's litigation costs.
If patent claims were found to be invalid in reexamination, inter
partes review or litigation in actions that do not arise from the events
related to drug approval, the patents would be removed from the Purple
Book’s list.

164.

The parties could, of course, agree to resolve issues in some other way.
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D. Expanding Patent Term Restoration
To better suit them for the roles discussed above, all patents listed
in the Purple Book, as covering some aspect of a biologic or biosimilar,
would need to receive an automatic extension of term to be coextensive
with the exclusivity granted as a result of FDA approval. The scope of
patent protection for the extended term would be limited to
enforcement in actions arising from the filing of an application for a
new biologic or biosimilar or the marketing of a biologic or biosimilar.
Unlike the current requirements for term extension, more than one
patent would need to be subject to extension for a given period of
exclusivity and the extension would apply to all existing claims.
E. Expanding the Safe Harbor
The exemption from infringement that the Hatch-Waxman Act
provides to companies making, using, or offering to sell patented
subject matter for the purpose of fulfilling federal regulatory
requirements already extends to biologics licensed under the Public
Health Service Act.165 This safe harbor from infringement was
originally designed to allow generic manufacturers to make copies of
reference drugs and conduct tests necessary to get approval of an
ANDA.166 However, the statute has been broadly interpreted by courts
to allow for many activities, including testing for the purpose of new
product development.167
Because true copies of reference products are usually not possible
when one is dealing with biologics,168 the safe harbor takes on an
additional role for companies making these types of drugs. It provides
them with an opportunity to explore how changes in production
methods result in products with different clinical characteristics and an
opportunity to collect data that can either be used to file an application
for a biosimilar or, in cases where the products are found to have
benefits that the reference product does not, to file an application for
an entirely new biologic.169 Thus, testing may result in products that
compete with the reference product primarily on the basis of price as
well as products that compete based on their distinct characteristics.
165. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
166. Jessica Chao, Examining the § 271(e)(1) Safe Harbor of the Hatch-Waxman Act: A
Legislative Proposal Granting Mandatory Post-Marketing Exceptions, 32 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. 651, 659-61 (2014).
167. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. 545 U.S. 193, 193 (2005); Momenta
Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA Inc., 809 F.3d 610, 619 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
168. Roth, supra note 160, at 257.
169. Id.
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In the regulatory scheme proposed above, the safe harbor would
be expanded to provide that it shall not be an act of infringement to file
an application for a biosimilar license or to market a biosimilar
provided that commercial sales do not begin during the first seven years
after the reference product was approved and provided that the
applicant complies with statutory licensing requirements, including
paying the sponsor of the reference product the statutory royalty fee.
Similarly, it should not be an act of infringement to file an application
for, or market, a new biologic product that is covered by a patent listed
in the Purple Book for a pioneer drug, provided that commercial sales
do not begin during the first seven years from the approval date of the
pioneer drug and provided that the applicant complies with statutory
licensing requirements, including paying the sponsor of the pioneer
drug the statutory royalty fee.
F. Promoting Improvements in Methods of Manufacturing
Biologics
What a biologic is depends on the way that it is made, and it is
very difficult to predict the effect that changes in methods of
production will have on the clinical characteristics of a biological
product.170 Although this means that biosimilar development carries
risks that the development of a generic drug does not,171 it also means
that there is an increased chance of discovering products with improved
characteristics and for the introduction innovative procedures. In this
sense, a company attempting to make a biosimilar is much closer to
being in the position of a new drug developer than a company making
a generic version of a small molecule drug.
Biosimilar development efforts have the potential of producing
three different results: (a) a product with essentially the same clinical
characteristics as the reference drug; (b) a product that has different and
beneficial characteristics compared to the reference drug; and (c) a
product that is either nonfunctional or inferior to the reference product.
If, as a result of efforts to make a biosimilar, a company finds a drug
with substantially improved characteristics compared to the reference
product, FDA regulations provide an incentive for the filing of an
application for a new biologic license.172

170. Price & Rai, supra note 91, at 1033-36.
171. Henry Grabowski et al., Implementation of the Biosimilar Pathway: Economic and
Policy Issues, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 523 (2011); Tanaka, supra note 116, at 661-62.
172. Costs associated with this are discussed in Jon Entine, FDA Balances Costs, Patient
Safety in the Biologics and Personalized Medicine Revolution, FORBES (July 23, 2012),
http://bit.do/Forbes_FDA-Balances-Cost.
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Unfortunately, there is relatively little incentive given to a
biosimilar developer for finding a method of producing a biosimilar
that is essentially the same as its reference product but where the cost
of production is much lower.173 Currently, a follow-on developer gets
no exclusivity unless they conduct further tests and establish
interchangeability. However, it is not generally clear whether the
benefit that this provides justifies the additional testing and expense.174
This may be remedied by granting a biosimilar producer exclusivity
similar to that provided to a new product. Specifically, the sponsor
would get a short period of complete exclusivity for their method of
production (e.g., one year) and a period of partial exclusivity matching
the remaining term of the reference product. During the latter, the
biosimilar producer would receive a statutorily-fixed royalty from
other companies making the reference product by the method
developed. As with a new biologic, the biosimilar maker could expand
the scope of their exclusivity by listing patents.
G. Litigation
Although one of the objectives of the BPCIA may have been to
avoid the need for litigation, it does not appear to be successful in this
regard, at least in part due to the convoluted nature of the patent dance
and inconsistencies in the text of the statute.175 Likely the best way to
improve this is to eliminate the patent dance and to rewrite the statute
entirely. Litigation could then be performed in accordance with the
various suggestions made above.
If an application for a biologic was judged by the applicant to fall
within the scope of the claims of a product listed in the Purple Book,
or if the applicant simply wanted to avoid potential litigation, a
certification statement could be included as part of the licensing
application identifying the relevant product and stating that the
applicant would not market the drug until the initial period of total
exclusivity had elapsed and thereafter would pay a statutory royalty for
the remaining term of exclusivity. In cases where such statement was
made, the applicant would not be subject to an infringement action.

173. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6)(A).
174. Jill Wechsler, Does Interchangeability Really Matter for Biosimilars?,
PHARMEXEC.COM (Nov. 3, 2015), http://bit.do/PharmExec_Does-Interchangeability-ReallyMatter.
175. Randi Hernandez, Biosimilars: The Litigation and Patent Challenges to Come,
PHARMEXEC.COM (May 4, 2015), http://bit.do/PharmExec_Litigation-and-Patent-Challenges;
Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff & Kristel Schorr, Have the Biosimilar Floodgates been Opened in the
United States?, 14 NATURE REVS.: DRUG DISCOVERY 303, 303-04 (2015).
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CONCLUSION
In 1983, prior to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act, only
about 13% of prescriptions were for generics.176 Ten years after
enactment, the percentage had risen to 36% and, by 2012, to 84%.177
The BPCIA was modeled on the Hatch-Waxman Act in the hope that
it would have a similar effect on the marketing of biosimilars and
ultimately lead to a dramatic decrease in the price of biologics.
However, factors affecting the market for biosimilars are substantially
different from those for generics and there are good reasons to think
that the effect will be much smaller.178
Part of the reason for the limited prospects for biosimilars
regulated under the BPCIA is that the structural complexity and nature
of biologics makes it much more expensive to develop and produce
these drugs.179 Unless incentives are present that encourage innovation
in general, and particularly innovations in the methods by which these
molecules are made, it is difficult to see how biologics will become
affordable to the great majority of people that need them.180 Although
the BPCIA, in its present state, does little in this regard, it may be
possible to amend its provisions to encourage innovation more
effectively. This is something that should not be overlooked by
Congress as they consider replacing portions of the ACA.

176. Garth Boehm et al., Development of the Generic Drug Industry in the U.S. After the
Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, 3 ACTA PHARMACEUTICA SINICA B 297, 298 (2013). There is some
discrepancy regarding these numbers. For example, Joanna Shepherd puts the pre-1984 number
at about 19%. Joanna M. Shepherd, Biologic Drugs, Biosimilars, and Barriers to Entry, 25
HEALTH MATRIX 139, 144 (2015).
177. Grabowski et al., Recent Trends, supra note 151, at 208.
178. Greenberg et al., supra note 147; Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 146, at 470-71;
Shepherd, supra note 176, at 155-60; Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding and
Incentivizing Biosimilars, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 61 (2012).
179. Price & Rai, supra note 91, at 1033-36.
180. Id. at 1062-63.

